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Abstract 
A national survey makes it possible to examine employees’ awareness of net overall 
reductions in the size of the workforce along with their awareness of employer policies that 
promise ‘no compulsory redundancies’.  Differences are investigated between union and non-
union workplaces, and between unionised workplaces with high membership density and 
those with low-to-medium density.  A union presence increases both job reductions and job 
security guarantees to employees, and high membership density has some additional effects 
in the market sector, but not the public sector. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Job security and insecurity have loomed large, in the past two decades, both in public 
debates about the risks1 of contemporary life, and in research on management policies 
and employee relations.  Widespread anxiety about job security in part emerged from 
the massive recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s, which witnessed UK 
unemployment rising to more than 3 million.  In the 1990s, additionally, it appeared 
that employers developed labour policies that called in question even the security of 
economic prosperity.  Old ideas about temporary lay-offs seemed overlaid by the 
tactics of downsizing: cutting employment even in times of business growth as part of 
a search for continuous labour cost reduction and ‘lean enterprise’ (Womack and 
Jones 1994; Heery and Salmon, 1999).   
 
It was against this background that job security agreements or guarantees rose to some 
prominence within British employee relations towards the end of the 1990s.  Survey 
evidence (Bryson and McKay 1997) revealed that there was an unmet desire among 
union members for their unions to bargain on their behalf for job protection.  The 
return of a Labour government to political power in 1997, followed by a more 
positive governmental and industry attitude towards unions, and some stabilisation of 
union membership (Gall 2004), provided a facilitative context in which agreements to 
strengthen job security could be discussed.  In addition, there was a growing 
influence, in management circles, of the ideas of ‘human resource management’ 
(HRM) and of associated ‘high performance work systems’ (HPWS), both originating 
in the USA.  Under at least some versions of HRM/HPWS (e.g., Kochan and 
Osterman 1994), job security was considered to be a valuable underpinning for a 
workforce that would be responsible, flexible, and able to learn continuously and take 
part in organisational innovation.   
 
Some British employers were offering employees limited job protection in the late 
1990s.  Most often, this took the form of a guarantee against the use of compulsory 
redundancy.  If job reductions were necessary, management would achieve them by 
other means, such as natural wastage or a call for volunteers to accept redundancy 
terms.  By this means, employees would at least be protected from being pushed onto 
the job market at times unfavourable for their re-employment prospects.  Such 
guarantees were also written-in to a number of new-style ‘partnership agreements’ 
between management and unions that attracted wide notice (IRS 1997;  TUC 1999; 
Brown, 1999, 2000; Kelly 2004).   
 
This article uses a national survey to examine employees’ awareness of job reductions 
at the workplace and of job protection guarantees.  This evidence is of a different type 
from that which is available in employer surveys with management respondents but, it 
will be argued, not less reliable if interpreted in its own terms.  Employee awareness 
contains an in-built threshold of salience or importance, and captures changes in 
employee relations of an informal type, as well as the more formal developments.   
 
The central questions to be considered here concern unions’ relationship to both job 
loss and job protection.  The evidence of the existing economic literature connects 
                                                 
1  Throughout this paper, ‘risk’ is used in its common-language sense of ‘chance of something bad 
happening’ rather than in its technical sense of (high) variance in an outcome. 
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unions, in several countries, with reduced employment by comparison with non-union 
workplaces, and this has generally been interpreted by labour economists as a 
consequence of the increased labour costs that unionised employers have to reckon 
with (Addison and Belfield 2004; Bryson 2004).   The existing evidence, however, 
does not reveal much about how the relative reductions in employment have come 
about.  From an employee viewpoint, there would be a considerable difference 
between, say, a loss of employment through a brake on rapid growth and a loss of 
employment through the presence of visible job reductions.  This difference is 
potentially important for employees’ views of union membership.  In this article, 
contrasts are estimated between job reductions at unionised and non-union 
workplaces, and between workplaces with different levels of union density. 
 
Job security guarantees have been discussed in Britain largely in the context of 
agreements between employers and unions.  But there is nothing to prevent employers 
at non-union workplaces offering such guarantees. The simple question whether 
employee perceptions of job protection are connected, in Britain, with union 
representation has not previously been answered.  It is another question with obvious 
relevance for the ability of unions to maintain their appeal to members and potential 
members. 
 
In addressing these issues, there are technical issues to be faced.  The most familiar of 
these is how to estimate and interpret the effects of unions.  A second is whether 
individual employees, the majority of whom are not located within management, can 
add anything of value to the information available from management respondents who 
are knowledgeable about employer policy. A third question, arising from the use of an 
employee sample, is how to allow for individuals sorting themselves into unionised 
and non-unionised workplaces, and into relatively secure or relatively insecure work 
situations.   
 
The next section of this article selectively discusses relevant literature about unions 
and job reductions, and about unions’ relation to job protection or ‘no compulsory 
redundancy’ guarantees.  The third section discusses the questions of methodology 
that have just been indicated.  Section four describes the dataset used and the 
variables derived.  Section five describes the methods of analysis, and section six the 
findings.  The seventh and final section summarizes the findings and draws 
conclusions. 
 
 
2  Previous research on unions,  job reductions and job protection 
 
Employees cite job protection as one of the most important goals for trade unions.  
British Social Attitudes Surveys ask employees in unionised workplaces what they 
think is the most important thing unions should try to do at their workplace.  Even at 
the height of the Lawson boom in 1989 ‘protecting existing jobs’ was equal first with 
‘improve pay’.  When employees are fearful of job loss it is far and away the most 
frequently cited goal.  Thus, during the depths of recession in 1993 the percentage 
citing ‘protecting existing jobs’ was double the percentage opting for the next most 
common goal (Bryson and McKay, 1997).  Even in 2001, when economic conditions 
were very good, the British Worker Representation and Participation Survey found 
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that ‘protection against unfair dismissal’ was by far the issue unionised workers 
thought was ‘very important’ for unions at their workplace (Bryson, 2005).  
 
There is conflicting evidence as to whether unions deliver greater perceptions of job 
protection. In the early 1990s, Gallie et al. (1998: 140-141) found that, ceteris 
paribus, union members were far less likely than non-members to believe they could 
be easily dismissed.  The authors speculate that this effect was due to union 
membership lengthening the necessary period for dismissal, concluding: 
 
“Despite the decline in union power over the last decade, it is clear that the unions 
still exercise a considerable influence at workplace level in ensuing stronger 
regulation of managerial powers”. 
 
And yet the same authors go on to find that, ceteris paribus, union membership was 
associated with greater dissatisfaction with job security (Gallie et al., op. cit.: 145-
146).   This is in line with other research.  Using BSAS data, Bryson and McKay 
(1997) find individual union membership and the presence of a recognised union were 
associated with higher perceived job insecurity over the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
There are various reasons why unionised workers might feel greater job insecurity and 
express greater dissatisfaction with job security than their non-member counterparts, 
even if they rate the probability of dismissal to be lower.  As part of the bargaining 
process unions may encourage ‘voice-induced complaining’ to strengthen their 
bargaining hand with the employer (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  Because unions 
increase the flow of information to employees those in unionised workplaces may be 
more aware of problems affecting job security than their non-union counterparts. A 
third possibility is that union members simply have higher expectations of their jobs 
than non-members.  Fourthly, the expression of greater insecurity on the part of union 
workers could reflect the greater costs of job loss faced by union employees which 
arise from the wage and fringe benefits premia unions achieve for their members 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003). This may explain why, in their analyses of the 
1986 SCELI2 and 1997 Skills Surveys Green, Felstead and Burchell (2000) found 
unionized workers envisaged greater difficulties than non-unionized workers in 
obtaining re-employment in an equally good job.  Green (2003) has reconfirmed this 
finding with more recent data. 
 
It is clear that job protection and employment security are matters of great importance 
to unionized workers, their perceptions of security differ somewhat from non-
unionized workers, and they expect their union to play a role in protecting jobs.  
What, then, do unions actually do to jobs and what measures do they take to enhance 
job protection? 
 
Evidence of unions’ effects on employment comes from surveys of individuals, on the 
one hand, and employer surveys on the other.  Beginning with surveys of individuals, 
although there is considerable evidence that unions reduce voluntary quit rates 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Bryson and McKay, 1987) and increase job tenure there 
are few studies that estimate factors associated with involuntary quits.  Those that do 
exist proxy union effects with a union membership dummy, thus potentially 
                                                 
2 Social Change and Economic Life Inquiry, incorporating a sample survey of adults in six urban areas. 
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conflating what the union does with the characteristics of employees who become  
union members.  Using SCELI 1986 Theodossiou (1996) finds that, conditional on 
being a job leaver, union members have a lower probability than non-members of 
leaving a job for unemployment.  They are also less likely to leave a job for reasons of 
redundancy, suggesting unions play some role in protecting employees from 
unemployment and redundancy. 
 
Turning to surveys of employers, there is a clear association between unionisation and 
lower employment growth rates.  The effect is in the order of a reduction in 
employment growth of 2.5-4 per cent per annum in the private sector, ceteris paribus 
(Blanchflower, Millward and Oswald, 1991; Machin and Wadhwani, 1991; Booth and 
McCullogh, 1999; Bryson, 2004; Addison and Belfield, 2004). Addison and Belfield 
(2004) are unusual in estimating union employment effects in the public sector.  They 
find the negative effects are similar to those for the private sector. Negative 
employment growth effects are more pronounced where bargaining coverage is high 
(Bryson, 2004), suggesting that unions may slow the rate of employment through 
wage bargaining.  This may occur if unions and employers bargain over wages but 
employers set employment levels unilaterally conditional on the wage, as per the 
‘right to manage’ bargaining model. To maximise profits they will choose an 
employment level that lies along the labour demand curve.3  
 
Negative union employment effects do not necessarily imply a greater probability of 
job reductions in unionized workplaces.  They could arise if unions make firms more 
reluctant to expand their labour forces because the union wage effect makes new 
recruits more costly for union than non-union firms and because unions impose 
additional costs on downward workforce adjustment through severance packages.  
Alternatively, they may inhibit employment growth by adversely affecting sales 
growth if higher union labour costs lower the returns to investment relative to non-
union firms (Hirsch, 1992) or if lower profitability in union firms means there is less 
internal capital available for reinvestment than in non-union firms. Empirical studies 
for the United States (Hirsch, 1990, 1992) and Britain (Denny and Nickell, 1991) 
suggest that unionised firms do make lower investments in capital than non-union 
firms. 
 
Employer surveys for Britain also indicate that unionised workplaces have lower 
dismissal rates than non-unionised workplaces (Cully et al., 1999: 128) and lower 
voluntary quit rates (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995), findings consistent with evidence that 
unionised workplaces have lower job turnover.  It is no surprise, therefore, to find 
unionised workplaces have longer average job tenure (Mumford and Smith, 2004). 
 
The evidence above suggests negative union employment effects may not result from 
within-workplace job cuts.  Yet it is only recently that studies have begun to consider 
this issue directly.  These studies indicate that unions are often involved in 
‘managing’ job cuts. For instance, Bryson, Capellari and Lucifora (2004) show 
unionised workplaces are more likely to have job security guarantees (JSGs) than 
non-unionised workplaces, but that JSG workplaces are just as likely to suffer job loss 
than those without a JSG.  The difference appears to be that JSG workplaces were less 
                                                 
3 Bryson (2004: 494-495) finds that when bargaining over employment and wages occurs the union 
effect on employment growth is ameliorated, as suggested by efficient wage bargaining theory. 
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likely to resort to compulsory redundancies.  The authors suggest that this is the 
reason why employee perceptions of job security were higher in workplaces with 
JSGs than those without. Bryson and White (2006) also find unionised workplaces are 
more likely to suffer within-workplace job cuts (i.e., cuts in particular sections of the 
workforce), are more likely to have JSG’s and are less likely to make compulsory 
redundancies than similar non-unionised workplaces.  These findings are supportive 
of case-study research by Kelly (2004: 281) who concludes “that the main function of 
‘job security’ agreements is to help companies jointly manage labor force reductions 
rather than avoid them”.   White (2005) also finds union recognition was associated 
with a combination of higher levels of labour cost-cutting in the form of workforce 
contraction and outsourcing, and better fringe benefits and family-friendly practices 
than non-unionised workplaces.  He interprets this as evidence of mutual gains, 
whereby unionised workers trade labour flexibility for higher benefits. 
 
 
3  Issues of method 
 
Employee data 
 
A variety of information on both job reductions and job protection is provided by 
mangers responsible for personnel in the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 
(WERS98). Why then seek information from employees, who will generally be less 
well informed? This is a valid objection if one’s chief interest is the formation of 
employer policy.  However, employer data is generally not sufficient to establish the 
personal experience of an employer’s policies by employees.  There are two reasons 
for this.  The first is that employer policies or practices often apply patchily across the 
workplace, including some groups while excluding others.  The second and more 
important reason is that individuals often classify and report employer policies in 
different ways from both management respondents and from analysts making 
inferences from quantified data.  
 
The latter point can be illustrated with the question of job reductions.  As noted in 
section 2, several econometric studies have estimated a union effect on workplace 
employment of around minus three per cent per annum.  But it seems unlikely that 
employees are able to judge the counterfactual of how much employment there would 
have been at the workplace in the absence of unions.  More likely, they will judge the 
condition of workplace employment by reference to net overall change during the 
recent past.  But how much contraction is needed before an employee notices or 
judges that change is taking place?  Unless one has a calibration of numerical change 
against employees’ judgement of change, one cannot infer the latter from the former.  
The form of change is also relevant, since smooth adjustments to recruitment have 
different connotations to redundancies.  A survey of employees can circumvent these 
interpretive issues, which arise with employers’ data, by directly asking the individual 
to make a qualitative judgement about change of employment, and similarly by 
posing questions about perceived job protection practices.   
 
Individual self-selection and sorting 
 
Analysis at the level of the employee brings individual characteristics into the picture.  
This is familiar in research on union effects on wages, under the rubric of self-
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selection and sorting.  For example, individuals who prioritise wages may seek out 
workplaces with a union presence if they believe that unions are generally able to 
push wages up.  Or again, individuals with low productivity (relative to their human 
capital) may seek out unionised workplaces if they believe that unions reduce wage 
differentials between more productive and less productive workers.  This type of 
argument can be applied to the subject-matter of this article by replacing wage-related 
terms by others relating to job security.   
 
Similar considerations apply when one is interested in employee reports or 
perceptions concerning several aspects of employer policy that are conceptually 
related.  The individual’s reports may become correlated through a personal 
characteristic that makes her or him interested in all related aspects of a policy area.  
Someone who is highly concerned about job security may closely watch changes in 
staffing levels and so be more able to report small reductions (or increases) than 
someone who lacks this interest.  The security-conscious person may also to a greater 
extent be watchful for management signals about job protection. 
 
For these reasons, employee-level analysis of employer policies (with or without a 
union dimension) is strengthened if some account can be taken of individual 
characteristics, either by inclusion of control variables or by analytic designs that 
permit some assessment of unobserved effects. 
 
Union effects 
 
The main hypotheses to be tested in this research concern the effects of the presence 
of a union at the workplace.  First, it is hypothesised to raise the probability of job 
reductions that are noticeable to employees.  Second, it is hypothesised to raise the 
probability of job protection being offered to employees.  Both these hypotheses 
imply that the presence of the union is (in some sense) a causal effect.  One needs to 
justify this type of hypothesis, especially because the data that will be used are of an 
observational and cross-sectional type.  
 
A reasonable justification exists if the main influences on the unionisation of 
workplaces are well known from previous research, and can be represented in the 
control variables for the analysis.  To identify the union effects, we may then assume 
that selection into unionisation is independent of the outcomes of interest, conditional 
on the control variables (Manski 1995: 37-43). It remains true however that if any 
omitted factors that influence union presence also affect the outcomes of interest, the 
results will be biased.  Most research on unions assumes that all relevant variables 
have been controlled. The main reason for making this assumption (in Britain) is 
because of the long history of unionism and because the presence or absence of 
unions is known to depend on a few circumstances that have a very powerful 
influence – notably sector (market or public), and size of workplace.  Although 
additional unobserved influences doubtless influence employers’ choices around the 
time of giving union recognition (for instance, particular changes in personnel policies 
may stimulate employees’ demand for union representation), most of these 
unobservable circumstances are long in the past and have often lost their relevance.  
According to WERS98, more than one half of unionised employment was in 
workplaces that had been established for at least 25 years, and a further one quarter 
was in workplaces that had been established for 10 to 24 years. Once a workplace has 
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decided on union status, it is rarely reviewed (Willman, Bryson and Gomez 2006).  
These considerations, coupled with the low rate of change in union recognition which 
began to prevail at the end of the 1990s (Gall 2004), suggest that one can reasonably 
treat unobservables as ignorable.  Furthermore, issues of self-selection into 
unionisation are scarcely relevant in the public sector where a presumption of 
unionisation has long prevailed (Millward et al. 2000). 
 
 
4  Data and variables 
 
The dataset for this research is the Working in Britain in the Year 2000 survey 
(WIB00) (see Acknowledgements).  This was a sample survey of employed people in 
Britain, carried out in the latter part of 2000 and early 2001.  Interviews were 
conducted in the home, by means of a structured interview and a short self-completion 
questionnaire, and on average were of one hour.  In total, 2466 people were 
interviewed, with an estimated response rate of 65 per cent.  Of these, 2132 were 
employees while the others were self-employed; the present article concerns only 
employees.  Data were weighted to correct for Kish sampling and to align the sample 
to national proportions (as estimated by the Labour Force Survey 2000).  The dataset 
and further documentation are available in the UK Data Archive. 
 
There are two dependent variables for the analysis.  The first, ‘job reduction’, is 
derived from the following question: “In the past 3 years has the number of people 
where you work in your current job got larger, smaller or stayed the same?”.  
Interviewers were instructed to accept answers for a shorter period from those who 
had worked for less than three years in their current job.  A “don’t know” response 
was also provided.  For present purposes, those answering “got smaller” were coded 1 
on the variable, otherwise they were coded 0.  Previous experience with this question, 
which was asked in the 1992 Employee in Britain survey, showed that experience of 
decreased employment at the workplace was a powerful negative influence on 
organizational commitment, while increased employment had no effect either way 
(Gallie et al. 1998: 243-5).  In treating those in the “don’t know” category as part of 
the ‘no job reduction’ group, we make the variable into a measure of salient (for the 
employee) job reduction at the workplace: not knowing about employment change is 
interpreted as meaning that nothing noticeable has happened.4  It is worth noting that 
reports of job reductions in the past three years were strongly associated (p<0.001) 
with employees’ expectations of redundancies taking place in the year to come.  This 
suggests that employees tend to be aware of persistent risks to job security; it is of 
course plausible that some employers make repeated job cuts because of external 
pressures and/or management policies. 
 
The second dependent variable, ‘no compulsory redundancy’, is derived from the 
following question: “Does your organisation have a stated policy of avoiding 
                                                 
4  Alternatively, one might exclude the “don’t know” responses from the analysis, which is equivalent 
to assuming that their underlying true values have the same distribution as the complete observations.  
If that were the case, then the coding used for the present analysis would be partially erroneous and 
would bias the estimates towards zero.  Variant analyses were run with the  “don’t know” responses 
excluded, as a sensitivity test: the results were similar to those reported below, suggesting that the 
amount of error introduced by our approach was slight.  The results of the sensitivity analysis are 
available on request from the authors. 
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compulsory redundancies and lay-offs?”.  Answers were coded ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t 
know’, and the variable was coded 1 for yes and 0 otherwise.  This applies the same 
salience interpretation as for job loss, in that a ‘don’t know’ reply is interpreted as no 
noticeable policy about job protection being present for the employee.5   
 
The main type of explanatory variable in the analysis concerns unionisation.  In 
parallel analyses, this takes two forms.  The first is ‘union presence’ and is based on 
the following question: “Are there any trade unions or equivalent organisations where 
you work?”.  Questions were also asked in WIB00 about personal union membership, 
but these are less relevant to the issues of overall workplace job loss and 
organisational avoidance of compulsory redundancy.  The union presence variable has 
the considerable advantage for an employee survey of simplicity: only four per cent of 
employees had a ‘don’t know’ or missing response here.6   
 
In addition to the union presence question, it is useful to have a variable that reflects 
the strength of the union in the workplace.  In principle, strong unions can bargain 
more effectively with management, and can also provide more effective voice 
services for their members and for management.  Individuals may also become more 
critically conscious of employer policies within a highly unionised setting. Within the 
public sector, particularly, most workplaces are unionised so comparisons with non-
union workplaces are somewhat uninformative; it is of more interest to see whether 
there are differences in outcomes between weaker and stronger unionisation.  
Accordingly, the second union variable is ‘union density’ and is based on the 
following question: “In your workplace, roughly what proportion of people doing 
your kind of work are members of trade unions or equivalent organisations?”.  
Responses offered on a show-card were: more than three quarters, half to three 
quarters, about half, a quarter to a half, less than a quarter, none.  Respondents unable 
to choose a category were treated as missing on this question.  We condense all the 
responses above ‘none’ and below ‘more than three quarters’ into a single ‘low to 
medium density’ category, leaving ‘above three quarters’ as the high density category. 
A limitation of the question is that it is confined to the respondent’s own type of 
work, rather than covering the whole workplace.  It taps into workplace bargaining to 
the extent that occupational union density, within the workplace, correlates with 
workplace union density.   
 
Control variables relating to unions are included in all analyses.  The largest influence 
on union recognition in Britain is whether the organisation is in the public or market 
sector.  The analyses to be reported were carried out separately for the public and the 
market sectors, thus allowing all parameter estimates to differ freely between sectors.  
Additionally, the within-sector analyses control for size (number of employees, in five 
bands), industry group (16 dummies), and region (11 dummies).The only control 
variable not available in this survey, though known to be an important influence on 
union recognition, is the age of the workplace (see Disney et al. 1995, Machin 2000 
and Millward et al. 2000).  Even here, the influence of this variable is largely confined 
to the market sector, since the public sector has a high prevalence of unionisation 
                                                 
5  See note 2. 
6 Union membership might be correlated with the propensity to voice complaints and with security-
consciousness.  However, union membership is not significantly associated with job cuts or job 
security guarantees and its incorporation made no difference to the results reported later. 
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even in new establishments.7  As discussed in section 5, the analysis incorporates a 
method of eliminating the effect of unobserved employer characteristics, such as age 
of workplace, that may affect the two outcome variables and unionisation.   
 
Some individual-level controls are also included.  These are: age and the square of 
age, gender, social class, marital status (single, partner not employed, partner 
employed), and contractual status (part-time contract dummy, and non-permanent 
contract dummy).  Social class is coded to the NSSEC-8 classification, except that 
self-employed categories are absent, so that there are six categories. Unobserved 
employee characteristics are eliminated along with unobserved employer 
characteristics (see below). 
 
 
5  Method of analysis 
 
The analytical issues presented by the subject-matter have been discussed in section 3.  
Here we describe the methods and assumptions that are applied in the analysis and 
note how these address the issues. 
 
The focus of the analysis is on the effects of unionisation on two outcomes, the 
occurrence of workplace job reductions and the occurrence of a ‘no redundancy’ 
policy, as experienced by employees. The salience interpretation of these responses 
suggests that each outcome can be considered as a cutting-point on an underlying 
continuum.  In this type of situation, it is common to apply the probit model (see 
Appendix).  The probit model belongs to an analytical family that also includes the 
logit model, from which it differs chiefly in the assumed underlying distribution of 
disturbances (see Wooldridge 2002 for an integrated presentation of the probit and 
logit models).  The normal distribution is assumed in the case of the probit model. 
 
A particular advantage of the probit model for the present case is that it can be 
extended to two dependent variables with correlated disturbances: the bivariate probit 
model.  As discussed in section 3, correlation between disturbances could arise either 
because individual employees have unobserved attributes that influence their reports 
of both outcomes, or because employers make joint decisions on job reductions and 
job security guarantees that are perceptible to employees, and these decisions are 
influenced by the employers’ unobserved characteristics.  If either of these 
circumstances applies, analysis by means of separate univariate probit models will 
give biased results.  The bivariate probit model handles the joint estimation of 
associated binary outcomes in an appropriate manner, and the correlation between 
disturbances is directly estimated.  In the present case, this correlation will capture 
unobserved influences that are shared by both dependent variables: both those that 
may arise from joint determination of policies by employers, and those that may arise 
from characteristics of employees. An additional point to note is that when the same 
regressor variables are used for each of the two outcomes, the distributional 
assumptions are sufficient to identify the estimates without imposing any further 
restrictions. For further details of the model, see Appendix, and for a full explanation, 
see Greene (2003). 
                                                 
7  WERS98 indicates that among public sector employees in establishments less than five years old, 95 
per cent had a recognised union. 
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To identify the union effects, we rely on the inclusion in all analyses of the wide 
range of control variables that was described in section 4, coupled with the 
elimination of unobserved influences captured in the correlation term of the bivariate 
probit model.   The method does not remove unobserved influences that affect one 
dependent variable but not the other.  However, because both dependent variables 
concern aspects of job security, it is reasonable to assume that any bias relating to one 
outcome and not the other (and also related to unionisation) will be small.  Also, any 
unobserved influence on either outcome variable that is not also related to 
unionisation does not affect the analysis. 
 
In all, four bivariate probit models are estimated: for each sector (market, public), the 
model is run first with ‘union presence’ as the explanatory variable, then with ‘union 
density’ as the explanatory variable.  For the latter, the focus is on whether a high 
density of union membership makes a difference as against low-to-medium density.  
All analyses use the weighting described in section 4, and a robust variance estimator 
that takes account of heteroskedasticity as well as of weighting in calculating standard 
errors.  (For further explanation of robust estimation, see Berk 1990.) 
 
Following presentation of the key estimates, we also present tables of the marginal 
effects of the union variables.  These represent the difference, in percentage points, in 
outcomes between union and non-union workplaces (or between high-density and 
low/medium-density workplaces), when all other characteristics are fixed at their 
means.   
 
 
6  Results  
 
Descriptive background 
 
One in four of British employees at the start of the 2000s reported a reduction of jobs 
at their workplace over the previous three years, a period marked by steady growth of 
total employment in the economy.  Nearly the same proportion (23 per cent) reported 
that their employer had a stated policy of avoiding compulsory redundancies and lay-
offs.  The association between the two responses (without introducing other controls) 
was significant, with the highest use of guarantees against compulsory redundancy in 
workplaces where employment had shrunk (Table 1).    
 
The proportions of employees reporting job reductions did not differ by sector, but the 
proportion reporting job protection differed greatly, with 17 per cent in the market 
sector and 35 per cent in the public sector (table not shown).   
 
One half of employees reported the presence of a trade union, or equivalent 
organisation, at their workplace (Table 2).   Confining this to workplaces with at least 
10 employees, to make it comparable to WERS98, this becomes 58 per cent: the 
WERS employment-weighted figure for union recognition is only slightly lower (53 
per cent), so it seems that union ‘presence’, reported by employees, is not far from 
‘recognition’, reported by a management representative.  There was also a reasonably 
good correspondence by sector.  Among market sector employees in WIB00 
(excluding those in the smallest workplaces), 40 per cent reported presence of a 
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union, against an employment-weighted figure of 39 per cent from WERS98; the 
corresponding figures for the public sector were 85 per cent (WIB00) and 91 per cent 
(WERS98).  The lower overall figures shown in Table 2 arise because of the inclusion 
of employees from the smallest workplaces, where unions are less often present (9 per 
cent of market sector employees and 71 per cent of public sector employees). 
 
 
The union density variable had 16 per cent missing who could not estimate 
membership.   Excluding these cases, the proportion of employees at workplaces with 
no membership was only slightly lower than the proportion with no union presence, at 
46 per cent (in other words, very few employees reported membership where they did 
not report a union presence).  ‘High density’ (three-quarters or more membership) 
was reported by 24 per cent of employees overall, and by 13 per cent in the market 
sector but 48 per cent in the public sector (table not shown). 
 
Results from bivariate probit models 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated effects for union presence, for each sector, while Table 4 
likewise shows the estimated effects of high union density.  These union effects are 
shown in the upper half of the tables, while the lower half presents the estimates of 
the correlations between disturbances, and the test for the null hypothesis that each 
correlation is zero.  This test is equivalent to testing the bivariate probit model against 
separate probit models for the two dependent variables, since these models differ only 
in the inclusion or exclusion of the correlation term.  
 
Looking across the two tables, one can see that for the market sector, the estimated 
correlations are positive and the Wald statistics are significant for both outcome 
variables at the 10 per cent significance level.  This supports the use of the bivariate 
probit model.  For the public sector however the estimated correlations between 
residuals are close to zero and non-significant at the 15 per cent level (a customary 
significance threshold for this type of test).  It therefore seems that employees in the 
market sector have some unobserved attributes (or their employers do) that influence 
both their experience of job reductions and their experience of job protection policies; 
but this does not hold for employees in the public sector.  
 
Focusing on Table 3, one sees that where unions are present, employees’ reporting of 
both job reductions and job security guarantees is higher.  This applies in both the 
market sector and the public sector.  The effects appear somewhat larger in the public 
sector, though it should be borne in mind that the practical significance may be less in 
the public sector since only a small minority there work in a non-union workplace.  
Overall, a union presence is important for both job reductions and job security 
guarantees. 
 
Turning to Table 4, one finds marked differences between the sectors in the effects of 
high union density.  In the market sector, high union density makes a difference 
compared with low-to-medium union density, significantly increasing employees’ 
reports of job security guarantees and, at a lower significance level, also suggesting an 
increased experience of job reductions.  In the public sector, the differences by union 
density are small and non-significant.  It seems that market sector employers have a 
high responsiveness to union density, as seen by their employees, whereas this does 
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not apply in the public sector.  This might be because high membership density is 
more prevalent (or ‘normal’) within the public sector. 
 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of the probability of job reductions and of job 
protection guarantees, for the unionisation variables, evaluated at the means of the 
remaining variables.  This brings out more clearly the different patterns across the two 
sectors.  In the public sector, ‘average’ employees in unionised workplaces are more 
likely, relative to non-union workplaces, to experience workforce reductions by 17 
percentage points, but they are more likely to experience job security guarantees by 
26 percentage points. In the market sector, a union presence brings the opposite 
pattern to ‘average’ employees, with a greater increase in workforce reductions (19 
percentage points) than in job security guarantees (11 percentage points).  However, 
where the employee’s union has a high density in the market sector, the pattern shifts 
more towards the public sector situation.  Compared with low-to-medium density, 
‘average’ employees in the high density market sector workplaces have a bigger 
differential for job security guarantees (15 percentage points) than for workforce 
reductions (10 percentage points).  However, these differences should be treated with 
caution as the probit model is non-linear and other patterns of marginal effects can be 
obtained for employees with characteristics that depart from the average.  The main 
conclusion to be drawn is simply that the marginal effects of unionisation on these 
two outcomes are generally large.  
 
The results shown in Table 5 correspond to the usual marginal effects from separate 
probit equations: for instance, the marginal effect of ‘no compulsory redundancy’ is 
averaged over cases where decreases in the workforce have occurred and where they 
have not occurred (and vice versa).  This is appropriate in the case of the public 
sector, as the two outcomes have uncorrelated disturbances, but less so in the case of 
the market sector.  With the bivariate probit specification, it becomes possible to 
evaluate the joint marginal effects in the presence of correlated disturbances. This is 
of policy interest since, as the discussion in section 2 indicated, job security 
guarantees can be given by employers either after the event of job reductions or in 
anticipation of job reductions: the latter is clearly more desirable from an employee 
viewpoint.  The joint marginal effects for the market sector, shown in Table 6, 
provide some insight into this issue.   
 
Looking first at the marginal effects of union presence versus non-union situations, 
one sees that unions make a significant difference to the provision of job security 
guarantees both in combination with job reductions and in their absence.  However, 
the union presence also increases the probability of job reductions in the absence of 
job security guarantees, and quantitatively this is the largest effect. Turning to the 
marginal effect of a high union density (relative to low-to-medium density), one sees 
a partly different picture. Unions with high membership density make a significant 
difference to job security guarantees both when job reductions have taken place and 
when job reductions are absent, but they do not significantly raise the probability of 
job reductions taking place in the absence of job security guarantees.  In the market 
sector, therefore, it seems that high union density is specially advantageous for 
employees’ overall job security. 
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7  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This article has examined employees’ awareness of job reductions at their workplace 
and their awareness of employers’ stated policies of job protection: avoiding 
compulsory redundancies and lay-offs.  The main aim has been to assess how 
employees at unionised workplaces differed from employees at non-union workplaces 
in their experience of these two types of outcome.   
 
Previous research has indicated that a union presence on average reduces workplace 
employment relative to counterfactually estimated employment.  However, such an 
effect might often not be visible to employees. This study shows for the first time that 
employees in union workplaces are more likely to notice absolute reductions in 
employment taking place than are employees in nonunion workplaces.  Additionally, 
however, employees in union workplaces are more likely to observe job protection 
policies by the employer.  In short, where unions are present, employees have to 
tolerate greater risk of job reductions but are also more likely to have some 
appreciable protection against the most adverse consequences for themselves. 
 
These differences in outcomes between union and non-union situations are common 
to employees in both the market sector and the public sector, but have less practical 
importance in the public sector since most employees there are in unionised 
workplaces.  For this reason, differences were also examined between employees 
whose work-groups had high union density and those in work-groups with low-to-
medium density.  High density made a difference in the market sector, intensifying 
the union effects on both outcomes.  But this did not happen for public sector 
employees.  In general, it seems that public sector employees are less affected by 
variations in unionisation, perhaps because for them unions with a major presence are 
the norm. 
 
The findings concerning unions and reductions in employment can be interpreted as in 
the  existing economic literature on unions and employment: employers are more 
likely to cut employment because their labour costs are higher in a unionised regime.  
On the other hand, the findings concerning unions and job security guarantees show 
unions continuing to carry out their welfare services for employees.  Job security 
guarantees are more likely to be forthcoming for employees in workplaces with a 
union presence, whether or not job reductions have been made in the recent past.  In 
other words, unions appear to be to some extent successful in obtaining at least this 
measure of job protection.  In the market sector, however, there is a further practical 
difference between workplaces with a union presence, taken as a whole, and the group 
with high union density.  Overall, a union presence in the market sector increases the 
probability of job reductions without any accompanying job security guarantees; but 
where there is a union presence with high union density, this particularly adverse 
effect on employees is largely removed while the favourable effects on job security 
guarantees are maintained.   
 
These findings could have important implications for union membership in the long 
run, but this will depend on several factors.  Do employees perceive the link between 
union membership and job reduction?  Assuming that they do see the link between 
unions and job protection (presumably unions will emphasise this link), how do they 
personally weigh job reduction against job protection?  And how does employees’ 
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behaviour (for instance, their decisions to stay or leave the employer, to join or leave 
a union) change in the light of job reductions and job protection? These are questions 
for future research that are stimulated by the results reported here. 
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Appendix: Probit and Bivariate Probit Models 
 
The probit model is commonly applied where an observed dichotomous response is 
interpreted as a function of a latent continuous response, e.g. 
 
yi=1 if y*i>0 
yi=0 otherwise 
 
The linear regression model for the latent variable is, in customary notation, 
 
y*i = β'ixi + εi  
 
and if the disturbances are assumed to have a standard normal cdf, then  
 
Pr(yi=1|xi) = Pr(β'ixi + εi > 0) = Pr(εi < β'ixi) = Φ(β'ixi) 
 
where Φ is the standard normal cdf.  The standardisation of the normal distribution 
(i.e., Var(εi)=1) is necessary for identification. 
 
The bivariate probit model extends the single-equation probit model to the situation 
where there are two binary dependent variables with correlated disturbances, and 
complete data on all observations (to distinguish this from the bivariate probit 
selection model).  For dependent variables Y1 and Y2 and observations i (i=1, … , n), 
one has four marginal probabilities, Pr(Y1i=0 & Y2i=0), Pr(Y1i=1 & Y2i=0), Pr(Y1i=0 
& Y2i=1) and Pr(Y1i=1 & Y2i=1).  
 
The bivariate probit model extends the probit model to this situation as follows: 
 
y*1=β'1x1 + ε1, y1 =1 if y*1>0, y1=0 otherwise 
 
y*2=β'2x2 + ε2, y2 =1 if y*2>0, y2=0 otherwise 
 
where 
 
E(ε1)=E(ε2)=0 
 
Var(ε1)=Var(ε2)=1 
 
Cov(ε1, ε2)=ρ 
 
To write the log-likelihood, put qi1=2yi1-1, qi2=2yi2-1, and wij=qij β'jxij,  ρi*= qi1 qi2ρ 
for j=1,2.  Then 
 
log L = Σ ln Φ(2)(wi1, wi2, ρi*) 
 
where summation is over the n observations and Φ(2) is the bivariate normal cdf (see 
Greene 2003: 849-51 for further details of estimation by maximum likelihood). 
 
When ρ=0, the log likelihood from the above model equals the sum of the log 
likelihoods from two separately estimated probit models for y*1 and y*2.  This leads to 
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the application of standard hypothesis tests (LR or LM, or Wald test in the case of 
robust estimation) for inference on the correlation term. 
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Table 1  Job reductions and job protection (‘no compulsory redundancy’) 
 
Job reduction    Job protection 
     row percentages 
    No  Yes  Total 
No    79.0%  21.0%  100% 
    (n=1246) (n=322) (n=1568) 
Yes    70.3%  29.7%  100% 
    (n=373) (n=154) (n=527) 
All    76.9%  23.1%  100% 
    (n=1619) (n=476) (n=2095) 
 
 
Table 2  Union presence by sector 
 
   Market sector Public sector All 
    column percentages 
No union present 66.6%  19.35% 50.0% 
   (n=903) (n=153) (n=1056) 
Union present  33.4%  80.65% 50.0% 
   (n=446) (n=593) (n=1039) 
Total   100%  100%  100% 
   (n=1349 (n=746) (n=2095) 
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Table 3  Bivariate probit estimates for the effect of union presence  
 Market sector Public sector 
 No compulsory 
redundancy 
Workforce has 
decreased 
No compulsory 
redundancy 
Workforce has 
decreased 
0.456 0.591 0.876 0.700 tu presenta 
(4.23)** (5.89)** (4.78)** (3.56)** 
Observations 1349 746 
athrho 0.1188 -0.0096 
Wald(1) 3.682 0.016 
p for Wald 0.055 0.898 
Note.  Estimates of effects are probit coefficients; t-statistics (absolute values) are 
shown in parentheses. **=significant at the 1 per cent level. 
a: Reference group: no union present   
 
Table 4  Bivariate probit estimates for the effect of high union density 
 Market sector Public sector 
 No compulsory 
redundancy 
Workforce has 
decreased 
No compulsory 
redundancy 
Workforce has 
decreased 
-0.123 -0.377 -0.723 -1.021 no unionb 
(0.99) (3.30)** (3.51)** (4.78)** 
0.529 0.262 0.138 0.168 union density 
highb (3.46)** (1.83)+ (1.02) (1.18) 
Observations 1145 620 
athrho 0.1257 -0.0351 
Wald(1) 3.673 0.187 
p for Wald 0.0553 0.6653 
Note.  Estimates of effects are probit coefficients; t-statistics (absolute values) are 
shown in parentheses.  +=significant at the 10 per cent level.  **=significant at the 1 
per cent level. 
b: Reference group: union density low/medium. 
 
Table 5  Estimated marginal effects (percentage points) of unionisation variables, by 
sector 
 Union presence (v. no union) High union density (v. low/medium) 
 No comp. redund. Decrease workforce  No comp. 
redund. 
Decrease workforce  
Market sector 10.9 18.8 15.4 9.8 
Public sector 25.7 16.9 (5.3)a (5.8)a 
Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the remaining variables.   
()a  Effect is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 6  Estimated marginal effects (percentage points) of unionisation variables on 
joint outcomes, for market sector 
Union presence 
(v. no union) 
High union density 
(v. low/medium) 
Joint outcome evaluated 
Effect Effect 
No compulsory redundancy=1 and Decrease workforce=1 6.9  8.4 
No compulsory redundancy=1 and Decrease workforce=0 4.3  7.0 
No compulsory redundancy=0 and Decrease workforce=1 12.2 (1.4) 
Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the remaining variables.   
()a  Effect is not statistically significant. 
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